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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1991).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Was there evidence presented, sufficient to establish

a genuine issue of material fact, that these defendants knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of a
dangerous condition?
Standard of Review:

In deciding whether the trial court

properly granted judgment as a matter of law to the prevailing
party, the Supreme Court gives no deference to the trial court's
view of law, but reviews it for correctness.

Utah State

Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Co., 776 P.2d
632 (Utah 1989).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint?
Standard of Review:

The decision to allow an amendment

of a pleading is discretionary with the trial court and will not
be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion resulting in
prejudice to the appellant.

Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245

(Utah 1983).
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APPLICABLE RULES
1.

Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applies to

the trial court's order granting appellees motion below.

The

rule provides in pertinent part as follows:
. . . The judgment sought shall
be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. (Emphasis supplied).
Rule 15(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable to
the second issue and provides in pertinent part as follows:
A party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of course at any
time before a responsive pleading
is served . . . otherwise a party
may amend his pleading only by
leave of court whereby written
consent of the adverse party; and
leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff alleges personal injuries as a result of riding
in an elevator on or about April 16, 1984. Plaintiff claims that
after the elevator doors closed, the elevator intermittently
raised and fell from floor to floor for a period of 40 minutes.
R. at 2.

Nearly four years later, plaintiff initiated this

action on March 29, 1988. After more than two years from the
time plaintiff had filed her original complaint, plaintiff moved
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for leave to file a first amended complaint, which was granted
March 3, 1990. R. at 59, 113. On October 9, 1990, plaintiff
again sought leave to file a second amended complaint.
376.

R. at

However, this time the court denied plaintiff's request.
In plaintiff's first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges

that these defendants knew, or should have known of the dangerous
condition of the elevator and that defendants negligently,
recklessly, and intentionally failed to repair the elevator and
to warn plaintiff that the elevator was in a dangerous condition.
R. at 144-150.
At the time of plaintiff's accident in 1984, Lee Peterson
was the property manager of the building's common areas.
at 385, f 5.

See R.

Mr. Peterson was not aware at any time prior to

plaintiff's accident of any problems with the elevators dropping
or rising rapidly.

See R. at 385, 5 5-7.

Nor had Mr. Peterson

received any complaints at any time prior to plaintiff's alleged
accident that any elevator at the subject property had dropped or
risen rapidly.

See R. at 385 5 5-7.

The only elevator problems

that Mr. Peterson had actual or constructive knowledge of, prior
to the time of the alleged accident were minor, generic
maintenance problems common to all elevators. Mr. Peterson was
not aware that an elevator could operate in the manner described
by plaintiff in her amended complaint.

The record contains no

evidence of information known by or available to these defendants
that would show the elevator was potentially dangerous.
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See R.

at 385 5 5-7.
Kenneth L. Fullmer has been an elevator technician for
more than 21 years and is responsible for servicing the elevators
at 185 South State.

As part of his job, Mr. Fullmer conducts a

weekly inspection of the elevators at 185 South State. Mr.
Fullmer testified that these elevators were "exceptionally good
elevators."

Mr. Fullmer also testified that the elevators were

equipped with numerous safety devices and it would be
"impossible" for the elevators to operate in the manner described
by plaintiff.

See R. at 385 f 8-10.

Ross A. Harrison has worked as an elevator serviceman for
approximately 18 years.

Mr. Harrison serviced the elevators at

185 South State for approximately a two-year period and
experienced no unusual problems with the elevators.

In the 18

years that Mr. Harrison has been servicing elevators, he has
never heard of an elevator operating in the manner described by
plaintiff in her amended complaint.

See R. at 385 f 11-12.

Ted Bambrough has been an elevator technician for 29
years and serviced the elevators at 185 South State.

In all of

Mr. Bambrough's experience, he has never heard of an elevator
doing the things described by plaintiff.

See R. at 385 5 13.

Finally, Brent J. Russon, manager of the elevator company
that serviced the elevators in question, has been in the elevator
business for 23 years. Mr. Russon is familiar with the elevators
in question and has been dealing with the building owners and
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managers since 1983.

Based on his 23 years in the elevator

business, Mr. Russon asserted that it was impossible for an
elevator to drop and stop and go and stop in the manner described
by plaintiff.

See R. at 386 f 14-17.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

The trial court was correct in finding that no material
issues of fact existed evidencing that these defendants knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the
alleged dangerous condition of the elevator.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to allow plaintiff to file a second amended complaint more than
two and a half years after plaintiff's original complaint was
filed and more than six and a half years from the date of the
alleged accident.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE DEPENDANTS KNEW
OR BY THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE CARE SHOULD HAVE
KNOWN OP THE EXISTENCE OP A DANGEROUS CONDITION
The law is well settled in this state that to hold an
owner or possessor of land liable for injuries to an invitee, it
must be shown that the owner or occupier knew, or in the exercise
of reasonable care, should have known, of the existence of a
dangerous condition.

Martin v. Safeway Stores. Inc., 565 P.2d

1139, 1140 (Utah 1977); Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc.. 538
P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975); Long v. Smith Food King Store. 531
5

P.2d 360, 361 (Utah 1973).
The duty of a property owner, vis-a-vis a user of the
premises, was the subject of the analysis by the court in Gregory
v. Fourth West Investments, Inc., 754 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1988).
The court in Gregory acknowledged that prior distinctions of
"invitee" and "licensee" have been eliminated.

The present rule

is that owners have "a duty to exercise reasonable care toward
their tenants in all circumstances."

Id. at 91. The Utah

Appellate Court then affirmed dismissal of the complaint against
the property owner because there was no showing of actual or
constructive knowledge of the alleged danger.

In so holding, the

court stated:
The plaintiff must demonstrate
that defendant knew, or in the
exercise of ordinary care should
have known, that a dangerous
condition existed and that
sufficient time had elapsed to take
corrective action.
Id. at 91.
Plaintiff tries to avoid the application of this rule by
arguing that the owner or operator of an elevator is somehow held
to a higher standard of care.

However, plaintiff cites no case

law stating that owners and operators of elevators are insurers
and that the actual or constructive knowledge rule does not
apply.

Rather, the actual and constructive knowledge rule has

been applied to elevator negligence cases.
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In Brown v. Crescent Stores, I n c . 776 P.2d 705 (Wash.
App. 1989), plaintiff sued the Crescent Stores for personal
injuries allegedly sustained from a fall in an automatic elevator
owned and operated by Crescent.

The door allegedly "shot out at

her" with great force and struck her on the right side, causing
her to fall inside the elevator.

The court held, that even

though the elevator operator had a duty for the safety of his
passengers, it was not an insurer and the fact of an accident and
resulting injuries alone did not give rise to liability.

Id. at

707.
The court further stated that, Crescent would not be
liable for the ordinary jolts and jerks that result in the
ordinary experience of operating an elevator.

Summary judgment

was granted on all issues except Crescent's duty to provide
manually operated elevators.

The court remanded for trial to

determine Crescent's liability on this limited issue only.
Plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment on her
allegations alone.

(Rule 56(e)).

Plaintiff has failed to raise

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether these defendants
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known
that the elevator in question was in a dangerous condition.

No

affidavits or other evidence from the record was produced by
plaintiff to establish notice to defendants of the alleged
danger.

Despite plaintiff's mention of routine maintenance

complaints, plaintiff has failed to produce any genuine issues of
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fact that prior to plaintiff's alleged accident, the elevator in
question had evidenced the kind of behavior that plaintiff
alleges resulted in her injuries.
Lee Peterson, the defendant's property manager and the
person designated to receive maintenance complaints regarding the
elevators had never heard so much as a rumor that the elevators
had previously operated in a manner described by plaintiff.

Five

experienced experts in the area of elevator maintenance and
repair all testified that they had never heard of an elevator
operating in the manner described by plaintiff.
think that such operation would be impossible.

Most of them
Absent some

indication that these defendants, as owners of the building, were
on notice of a possible hazard, it would be unjust to find
constructive notice of an event that experienced elevator experts
have never even heard of and do not believe could occur.
Furthermore, regular inspection and service of the
elevators did not provide these defendants with actual or
constructive knowledge of any dangerous condition.

The Utah

courts have ruled that even if a duty to inspect exists, "that
duty would not require discovery of a latent defect."

Gregory v.

Fourth West Investments Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App. 1988).
In Gregory, the plaintiff sued his landlord for damages to his
car resulting from the collapse of his landlord's shed while the
shed was covered with ice and snow.

The court applied the

traditional rule and held that defendant owed no duty to the

8

plaintiff because the defendant did not know and should not have
known of any dangerous condition existing in the storage shed.
The plaintiff then argued that the defendant had a duty to
inspect the storage shed and discover any dangerous conditions
that may have existed.

In response, the court stated that, "Even

if we assumed that defendant had a duty to inspect, that duty
would not require discovery of a latent defect."

Id. at 91.

In the case at hand, the alleged dangerous condition
existing in defendant's elevator is obviously latent.
date, the alleged defect remains unidentified.

As of this

The defect was

not discovered during the course of weekly inspections by
seasoned elevator technicians.
As the above analysis shows, the trial court was correct
in granting summary judgment.

In this case, a great volume of

tenants and occupants used the elevators at 185 South State on a
daily basis.

There was no complaint by anyone that the elevators

ever acted in the manner which plaintiff alleges or were
otherwise dangerous.

Further, after the alleged accident, no

defects could be found in the elevator and no other complaints
were registered evidencing the type of behavior plaintiff
alleges.

Property owners are not insurers of the safety of those

who come upon their premises.

These defendants are entitled to

some reasonable notice of a problem before they can be charged
with negligent failure to maintain safe premises.

9

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
The decision to allow the filing of an amended complaint
is discretionary with the trial court as part of its duty to
manage proceedings brought before the trial court.
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983).

Girard v,

The appellate court will

not disturb a trial court,s decision regarding the filing of an
amended complaint absent an abuse of discretion.

Id. at 248.

When analyzing whether to grant or deny a motion to amend, Utah
court's have focused on three factors:

(1) The timeliness of the

motion; (2) the justification given by the movant for the delay;
(3) the resulting prejudice to the responding party.

Regional

Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah App.
1989) .
Appellate courts have upheld a trial court's denial of a
motion to amend where the amendment is sought late in the course
of the litigation, where there is no adequate explanation for the
delay, and where the movant was aware of the facts underlying the
proposed amendment long before its filing.

Imperial Enter, Inc.

v. Firemans Fund Insurance, 535 F.2d 287, 283 (5th Cir. 1976);
Girard, 660 P.2d 248; and Wesley v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983)•
As pointed out in Regional Sales Agency, a trial court
does not abuse its discretion when it considers as a critical
10

factor in supporting its denial of a motion to amend a complaint
the length of time between the filing of the complaint and the
filing of the motion for leave to amend.

In Pope v. Lydick

Roofing Co. of Albuquerque, 479 P.2d 375 (N. M. 1970), the
Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the trial courts denial of
plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint filed over two years
after the filing of the initial complaint.

The court considered

the length of time between the filing of the complaint and the
filing of the motion for leave to amend as a critical factor
supporting its denial of the motion.
Similarly, in Appollo Tire v. United Bank of Lakewood,
N.A., 541 P.2d 976 (Colo. App. 1974), the court upheld the trial
court's decision denying plaintiff's motion to amend complaint
two years and nine months after its complaint had been filed.

In

support of its decision, the court made the following statement:
It (plaintiff) sought entry of a
new party, deleted some of the
original claims, and added some new
claims, this litigation had already
protracted and the granting of
plaintiff's motion to amend would
have required further lengthy delay
in order that defendants might
respond to the new claims for
relief.
Id. at 978.
In the case at hand, the plaintiff filed her motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint over two and a half
years after the initial complaint was filed and approximately six
and a half years after the alleged accident occurred.
11

Moreover,

the trial court had already granted the plaintiff one opportunity
to amend her complaint.

Plaintiff has failed to state any justi-

fiable reasons for such delay in raising her additional claim.
The plaintiff has been aware from the onset of this lawsuit of
the facts underlying the proposed second amended complaint.
Other important factors to be considered in deciding
whether or not to grant leave to amend pleadings, are whether the
proposed amendment will promote an economic and speedy disposition of the action, and whether the amendment will cause undue
delay and prejudice to the rights of any of the parties to the
action.

Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 459 (Alaska 1983).

One critical factor courts have considered in determining whether
undue delay and prejudice will result from an amendment is the
nature and extent of the amendment sought.
For example, injecting a new cause of action into a
lawsuit many years after the commencement of the suit and after
the nonmoving party has done significant discovery may be
prejudicial to the nonmoving party.

In Kelly v. Utah Power &

Light Co.. 746 P.2d 1189 (Utah App. 1987), the plaintiff sought
leave to amend her complaint three years after the filing of her
original complaint.

The court upheld the trial court's denial of

her motion to amend.

The court, in addition to considering the

untimeliness of the motion, held that the plaintiff's attempt to
inject a new cause of action into the lawsuit was prejudicial to
the defendants.
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In the case at hand, plaintiff's attempt to amend her
complaint for the second time to inject a res ipsa loquitur cause
of action is prejudicial because these defendants have been
preparing for over two and a half years to defend only on the
basis of premise liability.

These defendants have engaged in

substantial discovery, including the taking of depositions of
several key employees and experts who were directly involved in
the servicing and repair of the elevator in question.

These

defendants had no knowledge of this additional claim while
discovery was taking place.

Accordingly, these defendants did

not seek information specifically related to the res ipsa
loquitur claim.

It would be costly, inconvenient, and difficult

for defendants to retake depositions and engage in additional
written discovery.
All discovery in this case has been done with an eye
toward defending only the premise liability claim.

In Owen v.

Superior Court of the State of Arizona. 649 P.2d 278 (Ariz.
1982), the Supreme Court of Arizona stated:
Denial (of leave to amend) is
deemed proper exercise of the
court's discretion when the amendment comes late and raises new
issues requiring preparation for
factual discovery which would not
otherwise have been necessitated
nor expected, thus requiring delay
in the decision of the case.
Id. at 284.
Because the plaintiff's second amended complaint seeks to
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inject a new cause of action over two and a half years after the
filing of plaintiff's original complaint and after the trial
court had already granted the plaintiff an opportunity to amend
her complaint, the granting of plaintiff's motion to amend would
prejudice these defendants and cause further delay in this
action.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint.

The trial

court was justified in its decision because plaintiff had already
had opportunity to amend her complaint at one time and the motion
to file second a amended complaint was sought late in the course
of litigation.

Moreover, plaintiff has failed to give any

adequate explanation for her failure to allege res ipsa loquitur
in her initial complaint or in her first amended complaint.
Further, plaintiff certainly has been aware from the very onset
of this lawsuit of the facts underlying her proposed second
amended complaint.

Consequently, this court should uphold the

trial court's decision to deny plaintiff's motion to file a
second amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The trial court was correct in holding that the plaintiff
had raised no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have known that the elevator in question was in a dangerous
condition.

Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its
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discretion in denying the plaintiff leave to file a second
amended complaint to assert a claim of res ipsa loquitur.

The

orders of the trial court granting these defendants motion for
summary judgment and denying the plaintiff leave to file a second
amended complaint should be affirmed.
DATED this 5

day of June, 1992.
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